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instant case is just, were the harshness of the ruling not somewhat miti-
gated by the fact that, as the court pointed out, a guilty defendant can
now waive indictment, enter a plea of guilty, and begin serving his sen-
tence as soon as he is arrested.
12
The statute, commonly known as the "four term act," was enacted
to implement the constitutional provision for a speedy trial by stating
an arbitrary period during which any prisoner must be tried for his
crime or be discharged. As in cases where a statute of limitations is
applied, the guilt or innocence of the prisoner is not material to proper
execution of the statute, as the statute was enacted to prevent the govern-
ment from unduly harsh treatment of the prisoner and with the knowl-
edge that the guilty as well as the innocent might benefit from its appli-
cation. Even if it be conceded that no constitutional question is involved,
the expiration of the four months period, without the prisoner's having
been brought to trial, places him within the statute and entitles him to
be discharged. Since his guilt or innocence is not material to the statutory
right, it appears to follow that a plea of guilty should not waive the right
even after the period has elapsed.
Miss J. FLEMING
EMINENT DOMAIN-SETTING ASIDE VERDICT AND NEw TRIAn-
WHE JTHER REMITTITUR MAY BE UTILIZED IN A STATUTORY EMINENT DOMAIN
AcTION-In the recent case of Department of Public Works and Building
v. Huff,' the Supreme Court of Illinois considered a question of first im-
pression in Illinois: whether a remittitur was proper in a statutory emi-
nent domain proceeding? The defendants in the eminent domain action
had been awarded damages by a jury. The plaintiff condemnor moved to
vacate the judgment and for a new trial, urging that the verdicts were
beyond the range of the evidence. The trial judge overruled the plain-
tiff's motions on condition that the defendants consent to a remittitur,
which the defendants did. The plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme
Court of Illinois2 on the ground that the remittitur was improper because
there was no authority for the trial judge's action in either the statutes
concerning eminent domain3 or in the Civil Practice Act.4 That tribunal
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 702. See also, People v. Bradley, 7 II.
(2d) 619, 131 N. E. (2d) 538 (1956).
1 15 Ill. (2d) 517, 155 N. E. (2d) 563 (1959).
2 The opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois did not give the ground of direct
appeal from the trial court. However, the State of Illinois was interested as a
party, through the Department of Public Works and Buildings, which would fur-
nish a ground under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 75(1) (b).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 47, § 1, et seq.
4 IR. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 1, et seq.
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affirmed the judgment of the trial court despite the fact that no specific
authority for the remittitur was to be found.
In the early case of Johnson v. Joliet & Chicago RaiTroad Co.,5 the
power of eminent domain was declared to be an inherent power of sover-
eignty, exercisable at the sovereign's will. Perhaps because of the broad
sweep of that power, restraints upon its use have been present in the
organic law of the jurisdiction from the first such law, the Ordinance of
1787.6 The condition most commonly imposed has been that just compen-
sation be paid by the condemnor to the landowner. Following the Ordi-
nance of 1787, provisions making just compensation mandatory were con-
tained in Illinois' two earlier constitutions, those of 1818T and of 1848 ;8
the provisions were identical in those two documents, and both required
the consent of the individual landowners' own representatives in the
General Assembly, as well as just compensation. Although such restric-
tions on eminent domain are in the form of a prohibition upon the taking
of property for public use without just compensation, it was said in the
case of White v. People ex rel. City of Bloomington9 that such prohibitions
are references to the eminent domain power. Later cases have also held
that such constitutional references are direct restraints upon the power.' 0
In addition to constitutional inhibitions upon the power of eminent
domain, or perhaps in furtherance of them, the Supreme Court of Illinois
has held, in the case of South Park Commissioners v. Montgomery Ward &
Co.," that, while the power of eminent domain exists independently of
constitutions and statutes, the form of its exercise is to be prescribed by
statute. There has been at least an apparent disagreement in the deci-
sions of the court upon the exact nature of the power: in the case of
Zurn v. City of Chicago12 it was said that the General Assembly possesses
the power of eminent domain, while in the case of Chicago and North-
western Ry. Co. v. Chicago Mechanics' Institute,13 it was declared that
5 23 Ill. 124 (1859). See also Western Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville & M. R. Co.,
270 Ill. 399, 110 N. E. 583, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 670 (1915).
6 Section 14, Art. II. The Ordinance of 1787 may be found in Smith-Hurd, Ill.
Ann. Stat., Const. Vol., p. 92.
7 Ill. Const. 1818, Art. VIII, § 11.
8 Ill. Const. 1848, Art. XIII, § 11.
994 Ill. 604 (1880).
10 Litchfield & Mad. Ry. Co. v. Alton & S. R. 1&, 305 Ill. 388, 137 N. E. 248 (1922);
Noorman v. Dept. of Public Works and Buildings, 366 In. 216, 8 N. E. (2d)
637 (1937).
11248 Ill. 299, 93 N. E. 910 (1911). See also Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v.
Manasse, 380 Ill. 27, 42 N. R. (2d) 543 (1942), and Dept. of Public Works and
Buildings v. Kirkendall, 415 Ill. 214, 112 N. EL (2d) 611 (1953).
12 389 Ill. 114, 59 N. E. (2d) 18 (1945).
18 239 Ill. 197, 87 N. E. 933 (1909).
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the legislature has control over the exercise of the power. The foregoing
distinction is probably immaterial if those two cases are regarded alone,
and is certainly so if the present constitutional and statutory restraints
on the power to condemn property are taken into consideration. The
section of the present Illinois Constitution establishing the power, lays it
down that compensation shall be determined by a jury when not made by
the State.14 By the section of the statute on eminent domain concerning
the jury's oath in such cases, the jury are to be sworn to ascertain and
report just compensation.15 Hence, whether the General Assembly holds
the power, as said in the Zurn case, or only controls its use, as in the Me-
chanics' Institute case, it is certain that, first, the power is intended to be
set out and regulated by statute, and second, that under any such statute,
just compensation is to be determined by a jury.
It is probable that the belief of legislatures, courts, and drafters of
organic laws that just compensation could be determined only by a jury
led to such statements as, in the case of Calumet River Railway Co. v.
Moore,16 that the determination of damages was the jury's special province
and their findings would not be upset as long as they were within reason
and free from corruption, passion and prejudice. 1 7  Hence, despite a
holding in the case of Kiernan v. Chicago, Santa Fe and California Ry.
Co.' s that the jury can alter their own verdict in a land condemnation
suit, the general rule has been that an erroneous verdict in an eminent
domain proceeding must be cured by a new trial, that is, that just
compensation may be determined or redetermined only by a jury, whether
the verdict was excessively large or merely not within the range of evi-
dence, 19 as was argued in the present case. Some weight has been given
to the fact that the jury had viewed the premises to assist them in deter-
14 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 13. In connection with the exception for compensa-
tion made by the State from determination by a jury, cf. Ill. Const. 1870 Art. IV,
§ 26, which prevents the State from ever being made a defendant in any court. If
the State proper were the condemnor, the jury would assess damages against the
State in a condemnation action, a result disharmonious with the purpose of Art.
IV, § 26. However, compensation is not "made by the State" when It is paid by
an agency or instrumentality of the State, in the same way that a suit against such
an agent or Instrumentality Is not a suit in which the State is a defendant, Burke
v. Snively, 208 Ill. 328, 70 N. U. 327 (1904).
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 47, § 8.
16 124 Ill. 329, 15 N. E. 764 (1888).
17 With regard to the fixity of the jury's verdict against everything but passion,
prejudice or undue influence, see also Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Cullerton, 147
Iii. 385, 35 N. . 723 (1893) and Cook County v. North Shore Electric Co., 390 Ill.
147, 60 N. U. (2d) 855 (1945).
is 123 Ill. 188, 14 N. E. 18 (1887).
19 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Schneider, 127 Ill. 144, 20 N. E. 41 (1889) (ex-
cessively large verdict); City of Chicago v. Matteson, 274 Ill. 308, 113 N. E. 595
(1916) (verdict not within the range of the evidence).
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mining the quantum of damages,20 but a new trial has been ordered after
an unnecessarily generous verdict even where the jury did view the prem-
ises.21 In the instant case, a remittitur was used to adjust the jury's
verdict despite this long background of new trials as the only cure for
an excessive verdict in eminent domain.
The term remittitur, or fully, remittitur damna, refers to a remission,
by the party who has received a judgment in damages, of some part of
the judgment which is, or is thought by the court to be, excessive. 22  The
party remitting usually does so as an alternative to a new trial. Re-
mittitur apparently arrived in Illinois practice quite early, although the
earliest cases dealing with it are a trifle vague in regard to authority for
sustaining its use. In the comparatively early case of McCausland v.
Wonderly,23 it was said to be settled practice, but no Illinois authority
was cited to support the proposition. In the case of Illinois Central Rail-
road Co. v. Blye,2 4 where it was held that remittitur was an allowable
cure for an excessive verdict, there was also a statement that remittitur
was settled practice, but without citations to authority. In the case of
Libby, McNeil & Libby v. Scherman,25 cited by the court in the instant
case, it was said that remittitur was too well established to be then called
into question, but no authority was furnished.26  In the McCausland case,
the arguments of counsel included a statement that a remittitur could
be utilized in actions ex contractu but not in actions ex delicto, where
unliquidated damages were to be fixed by a jury. The court there rejected
the contention; but it is suggested that some of the unwillingness of courts
to modify awards of damages in land condemnation cases may come from
a reluctance to interfere in the jury's peculiar function of valuing un-
liquidated claims, and that the rule urged on the court in the McCausland
case had had some efficacy earlier and strengthened the rule that a new
trial was the only remedial measure for an excessive verdict in eminent
domain proceedings. This view is assisted by a consideration of the
career of additur in the courts of Illinois. In the case of Carr v. Miner, 2
an additur in a contract action was upheld where it served to give the
20 South Park Com'rs. v. Livingston, 344 Ill. 368, 176 N. E. 546 (1931) ; Dept. of
Public Works and Buildings v. Bohne, 415 Il1. 253, 113 N. E. (2d) 319 (1953).
21 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Schneider, 127 Ill. 144, 20 N. E. 41 (1889).
22 39 Am. Jur., New Trial, § 210, p. 204; 76 C. J. S., Remittitur, p. 905.
23 56 Ill. 410 (1870).
24 43 Ill. App. 612 (1892).
25 146 Il. 540, 34 N. E. 801, 37 Am. St. Rep. 191 (1893).
26 Cf. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 79 L. Ed. 603, 55 S. Ct. 296 (1935), where
the U. S. Supreme Court considered the common law backgrounds of both re-
mittitur and additur.
27 42 Ill. 179 (1866).
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plaintiff the ten percent interest provided in the contract, which was not
usurious at that time, instead of the six percent the jury had awarded.
In the case of James v. Morey,28 an additur was allowed in an action
for rent when the jury brought in a verdict much smaller than the amount
due by the lease. Both the foregoing cases were distinguished in the
case of Yep Hong v. Williams,29 where the trial court had, by agreement,
ordered an additur in an action for personal injuries incurred in an
automobile accident; it was said that additur would not be allowed in
an action for unliquidated damages, although it might be unobjectionable
in an instance, as in the Carr and James cases, where the sum sought
to be added was itself certain and it was clearly erroneous not to permit
it.30 All three cases fit within the rule unsuccessfully stated by counsel
in the McCausland case, that the jury must fix the amount of unliquidated
damages. But whatever its genesis, the rule admitted of no exceptions
in eminent domain until the remittitur in the instant case was upheld.
Remittitur, as has been said, was known to the common law practice
of Illinois. Neither the statute covering eminent domain3' nor the Civil
Practice Act3 2 regulate remittitur in trial courts in any detail, but the
latter specifies that, in all matters not regulated by statute or rule of
court, the practice at common law and in equity shall continue. 3 It was
upon this proviso that the court relied to reach the result in the instant
case. The first section of the Civil Practice Act sets forth the scope of
the Act, and excepts eminent domain, among other special actions, from
its purview, but only to the extent that procedure in eminent domain is
regulated by the statute upon that subject; in matters not regulated by the
statute, the Civil Practice Act is to apply.3 4 As was said, the law of
eminent domain attempts no regulation of remittitur, which leaves the
Civil Practice Act as the applicable law. But neither does the Civil
28 44 Ill. 352 (1867).
296 Il. App. (2d) 456, 128 N. E. (2d) 655 (1955), noted in 34 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 186 and discussed in 35 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 45.
30 oCf. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 4174, 79 L. Ed. 603, 55 S. Ct. 296 (1935),
wherein the U. S. Supreme Court concluded that since remittitur, but not additur,
was known and practiced as the common law of England prior to the adoption of
the U. S. Constitution, an additur in an action for damages for personal injuries
in a federal court deprived the defendant of his right of trial by jury.
31 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 47, § 1, et seq.
32Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 1 et seq. See particularly § 68.1(7),
cited by the court, where it is provided that consent to a remittitur does not bar
a party from arguing for the verdict on appeal; and § 92(1) (e), also cited by the
court, which gives appellate courts power to enter a remittitur. Neither section
refers to remittitur in the trial court except by implication.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 1.
-4 See Wintersteen v. National Cooperage Co., 361 Ill. 95, 197 N. E. 578 (1935),
cited by the court in the instant case, which declares that the Civil Practice Act
does not apply only where the specific statute regulates procedure.
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Practice Act regulate remittitur specifically. Hence, as the Court con-
strued the Civil Practice Act, remittitur was outside the scope of the
act and therefore by the Act's own terms, was within the small area of
practice still governed by the common law, whereunder a remittitur was
permissible.
To reach this result, the court departed from a rule expressed in the
case of Department of Public Works and Buildings v. O'Brien,3 5 where
it was said that proceedings under the statute of eminent domain are
regulated entirely by the statute and not at all by the common law rules
of pleading or practice. However, in the O'Brien case, the point at issue
was whether the record in an eminent domain proceeding could be altered
by a method similar to a writ of error coram nobis. As contrasted with
the present case, the Court simply held, in the O'Brien case, that, since
Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act3 6 abolished coram nobis and sub-
stituted a motion procedure adapted to the same end, Section 72 governed
the decision and coram nobis, a conunon law procedure, would not be
allowed. The statement in that case, that the common law pleading or
practice had no application to a statutory eminent domain proceeding, is
a good deal broader than the point decided, and the conflict between that
and the instant case is apparent rather than real.
The instant case throws into relief some larger questions concerning
the respective roles of judge and jury in trials at law, principally whether
there is really a clear line of separation between the jury as trier of fact
and the judge as court and the trier of law. It has been said that the
parties have a privilege to have contraverted questions of fact tried by
a jury.37 It was intimated in the early case of Vincent and Bertrand v.
Morrison38 that a verdict was defective in which the jury found evidence
rather than facts; the attendant implication is that the jury's business
is fact-finding exclusively. The court cannot coerce even one recaleitrant
juror into acquiescence in the majority opinion without committing re-
versible error 3 9  Further, where as in the case of Kane v. Kinnare,40 the
judge by his remarks during a witness' testimony, wrongly suggests a
conclusion upon the evidence to the jury, reversal will follow; and re-
marks like the following may be elicited from the Appellate Court, as
they were in that case: "One of the greatest difficulties of a nisi prius
35 402 Ill. 89, 83 N. E. (2d) 280 (1949).
36 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 72.
37 Morrison Hotel and Restaurant Co. v. Kirsner, 245 Ill. 431, 92 N. E. 285 (1910).
381 II. 227 (1827).
89 Lively v. Sexton, 35 Ill. App. 417 (1890).
40 69 Il. App. 81 (1896).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
judge is to keep his mouth shut. I had twenty-five years experience of
it . . . Many judgments have been reversed in this state because the
judge talked too much." '4 1  The import of these cases is that the judge
may in no instance interfere with the fact-finding function of the jury
while it is in progress. In contrast to that, however, one may place some
authorities to the effect that the judge has considerable freedom to amend,
construe and modify the jury's verdict if its meaning is clear. In the
case of Law v. Sanitary District of Chicago42 it was said that the verdict
could be construed and amended by reference to the pleadings and proof
where the intention of the jury was apparent, and it was there done. In
view of the foregoing, it seems that the instant case did not work any
profound change in the law, since it has for a long time been true that
a jury's verdict is amenable to change by the court where change is
reasonably and clearly indicated, as long as the court does not interfere
in the jury's deliberations other than in the usual way, ie., by instruc-
tions. To this must be added the effect of the newer attitude of the
courts toward the trial process. In the case of Simmons v. Columbus
Venetian Stevens Buildings, InC.43 that attitude was thus expressed: "...
courts should attempt to do substantial justice when all the facts are
completely disclosed." Clearly, from such a principle, an appropriate
impatience with the finer technicalities of jury trials will arise and lead
to generally wholesome results such as that in the case under consideration.
If the customary conditions of remittitur are fulfilled, in that the
defendant in an eminent domain proceeding consents to the reduction of
the verdict, there is no good reason to keep alive the rule that only a jury
can assess damages in eminent domain. In a time of large public works
and vast land clearance schemes, such a rule adds nothing to the work of
land condemnation except delay, and public policy clearly favors ex-
peditiousness in such undertakings. The construction put upon the Civil
Practice Act is entirely harmonious with its purposes and in accord with
the needs of modern practice in eminent domain actions.
R. 0. YouNG
41 69 Ill. App. 81, at 83.
42 197 Ill. 523, 64 N. E. 536 (1902).
4320 11U. App. (2d) 1, 155 N. E. (2d) 372 (1959).
